In 2025, the Russian military added over 1,000 new recruits per day. Most regions easily met their quotas and stopped increasing their sign-on bonuses. However, recruitment slowed down in May.
So Russians need to recruit people at a lower rate (1 person per year per ~300 population) than at which Covid was killing people during the pandemic (1 death per ~150 people per year) . Of course the recruitment rate equals the loss rate.
This is biologically sustainable. Easily. Leave half of the male population unmolested, normal full lives etc, let the other half start families and have children, and mobilize him at his 35th birthday. Or at 40th birthday, or 45th, does not matter. This (math) will provide indefinitely that 1000 recruits per day, from the Russian population. Question, is this sustainable socially?
Janis, we have discussed before, and you seem to have agreed with me, that these numbers do NOT reflect net recruitment. At best, they reflect gross recruitment, that is, the unknown share of men willing to serve some short term (presumably several months) and re-enlist over and over again, each time with new sign-on bonuses. If so, they are most likely well known to their local recruitment offices (voenkomat). These offices most likely coordinate their re-entry with the plans and current plan fulfillment data, in order to smooth the process over time. All Soviet and post-Soviet people know very well that plans must not be too over-fulfilled because the next plans will be increased accordingly.
What we do not know is the length of the contract term, and whether it is kept constant or changes over time. This unknown factor could be critically important if we want to estimate the recruitment and discharging flows, and only with these data can we estimate the net flows and their impact on the war and the economy.
What we do know is that, as long as Ukaz 647 is in force, your contract with the military extends automatically. So recruited men don't have the opportunity to go back home, and cannot enlist multiple times. If you have any anecdotal evidence that the opposite is the case, please share some sources. I searched for it and couldn't find anything.
She explicitly underscores the different status of enlisted and volunteer contractors (контракторы and добровольцы). Both have the same pay, but the latter ("volunteers") serve only the limited term. Back then, she made a link to Medvedev's assertion according to which during the first 10 months of 2023 the share of short-term volunteers was about 20 % (https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/10/2023/653925779a79476038209088). This share could have changed, possibly dramatically, or not.
The problem is that both categories have their contract, so most journalists and officials fail to differentiate between them, as they are all serving with a contract, with the same pay and probably same sign-on bonuses.
However, another of your links gives us a hint. URA News said (it was March 2023):
"С подачи местного ЦУРа на официальных страницах мэрий городов и районов начали появляться первые объявления о наборе контрактников — для службы на Крайнем Севере, во флоте, военных комендатурах по всей России."
It meant that at least some enlisted contractors will be serving in the rear units and will not be sent to the trenches. To this extent, it must be seen as the ongoing transition from the conscript-based service toward the professionalization. On the other hand, all short-term volunteers obviously are being sent to the war zone.
These two categories must have very different preference schedules. Enlisted contractors expect to make military service their life-time career, to have all family benefits and a military pension when retired; "volunteers" are looking for immediate fortune. It is mostly the latter we are trying to estimate.
The point is that volunteers don't get the sign-on bonus, so they are not relevant for this particular calculation. Imagine if they would get the bonus: then nobody would sign the contract that auto-extends until death/injury, and instead everybody would just become a volunteer twice a year. But instead, only 10% are volunteers and 90% become kontraktniki. Because you only get the bonus as a kontraktnik. You can read it here for the federal bonus:
"Добровольцам выплаты не полагаются, поскольку они заключают контракт о пребывании в добровольческом формировании, а не о прохождении военной службы и военнослужащими не являются."
I must correct myself. Ukaz 644 (2024) is just a copy-paste of 2022 ukaz 787. But it seems to be not so much a sign-on bonus, but a blanket one-time payment to everyone serving in the military. Or am I wrong?
On the one hand, that's true: this ukaz does not extend the federal sign-on bonus to the volunteers.
On the other hand, what about the local governments, which seem to bear the main sign-on burden (if it exceeds 400K federal amount)? Do they pay the bonus to the so-called volunteers (de facto short-term contractors)? Or they don't?
Anyway, this ukaz was issued just 10 months ago, and we are talking about longer trends, aren't we?
By the way, are there reliable (or even indirect) sources about the share of volunteers, beyond the Mevedev's 2023 assertion?
So Russians need to recruit people at a lower rate (1 person per year per ~300 population) than at which Covid was killing people during the pandemic (1 death per ~150 people per year) . Of course the recruitment rate equals the loss rate.
This is biologically sustainable. Easily. Leave half of the male population unmolested, normal full lives etc, let the other half start families and have children, and mobilize him at his 35th birthday. Or at 40th birthday, or 45th, does not matter. This (math) will provide indefinitely that 1000 recruits per day, from the Russian population. Question, is this sustainable socially?
Very useful and valuable research, thank you.
Janis, we have discussed before, and you seem to have agreed with me, that these numbers do NOT reflect net recruitment. At best, they reflect gross recruitment, that is, the unknown share of men willing to serve some short term (presumably several months) and re-enlist over and over again, each time with new sign-on bonuses. If so, they are most likely well known to their local recruitment offices (voenkomat). These offices most likely coordinate their re-entry with the plans and current plan fulfillment data, in order to smooth the process over time. All Soviet and post-Soviet people know very well that plans must not be too over-fulfilled because the next plans will be increased accordingly.
What we do not know is the length of the contract term, and whether it is kept constant or changes over time. This unknown factor could be critically important if we want to estimate the recruitment and discharging flows, and only with these data can we estimate the net flows and their impact on the war and the economy.
What we do know is that, as long as Ukaz 647 is in force, your contract with the military extends automatically. So recruited men don't have the opportunity to go back home, and cannot enlist multiple times. If you have any anecdotal evidence that the opposite is the case, please share some sources. I searched for it and couldn't find anything.
I gave you the sources when we discussed it the first time:
https://janiskluge.substack.com/p/russia-recruited-166000-new-soldiers/comments#comment-72743577
One of my sources was the press release of the Russian ministry of defense, another - the staged meeting arranged for Putin in Chechnya.
ALso, you may wish to take a close look at the December 2023 Farida's post which you linked yourself:
https://zapiska.substack.com/p/400
She explicitly underscores the different status of enlisted and volunteer contractors (контракторы and добровольцы). Both have the same pay, but the latter ("volunteers") serve only the limited term. Back then, she made a link to Medvedev's assertion according to which during the first 10 months of 2023 the share of short-term volunteers was about 20 % (https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/10/2023/653925779a79476038209088). This share could have changed, possibly dramatically, or not.
The problem is that both categories have their contract, so most journalists and officials fail to differentiate between them, as they are all serving with a contract, with the same pay and probably same sign-on bonuses.
However, another of your links gives us a hint. URA News said (it was March 2023):
"С подачи местного ЦУРа на официальных страницах мэрий городов и районов начали появляться первые объявления о наборе контрактников — для службы на Крайнем Севере, во флоте, военных комендатурах по всей России."
https://ura.news/articles/1036286412
It meant that at least some enlisted contractors will be serving in the rear units and will not be sent to the trenches. To this extent, it must be seen as the ongoing transition from the conscript-based service toward the professionalization. On the other hand, all short-term volunteers obviously are being sent to the war zone.
These two categories must have very different preference schedules. Enlisted contractors expect to make military service their life-time career, to have all family benefits and a military pension when retired; "volunteers" are looking for immediate fortune. It is mostly the latter we are trying to estimate.
The point is that volunteers don't get the sign-on bonus, so they are not relevant for this particular calculation. Imagine if they would get the bonus: then nobody would sign the contract that auto-extends until death/injury, and instead everybody would just become a volunteer twice a year. But instead, only 10% are volunteers and 90% become kontraktniki. Because you only get the bonus as a kontraktnik. You can read it here for the federal bonus:
"Добровольцам выплаты не полагаются, поскольку они заключают контракт о пребывании в добровольческом формировании, а не о прохождении военной службы и военнослужащими не являются."
https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_432078/5673be26554b612479f3e42f10c3b069854b95e7/
I am not arguing with you, I merely want to clarify this issue for myself.
I must correct myself. Ukaz 644 (2024) is just a copy-paste of 2022 ukaz 787. But it seems to be not so much a sign-on bonus, but a blanket one-time payment to everyone serving in the military. Or am I wrong?
On the one hand, that's true: this ukaz does not extend the federal sign-on bonus to the volunteers.
On the other hand, what about the local governments, which seem to bear the main sign-on burden (if it exceeds 400K federal amount)? Do they pay the bonus to the so-called volunteers (de facto short-term contractors)? Or they don't?
Anyway, this ukaz was issued just 10 months ago, and we are talking about longer trends, aren't we?
By the way, are there reliable (or even indirect) sources about the share of volunteers, beyond the Mevedev's 2023 assertion?